In my previous blogs, I’ve consistently emphasized the risks associated with the traditional security model, which necessitates constant, unvalidated updates to the kernel. This approach, not only ineffective in preventing breaches from what it can’t detect, can lead to catastrophic outcomes, such as the incident involving CrowdStrike. The need for a
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There is no love lost between George Kurtz, the CEO of CrowdStrike, and Microsoft. This antagonism has been well-publicized, particularly in light of recent statements and the ongoing battle for cybersecurity supremacy. However, the latest developments might have given Microsoft a significant upper hand, posing a potentially existential threat to CrowdStrike’s
In the world of cybersecurity, precision and transparency are paramount. This brings us to an intriguing issue surrounding Crowdstrike’s Rapid Response Content. At the core of the debate lies the question: Is Rapid Response Content “code” (<– Existential bet)? Crowdstrike argues that it is not. However, an examination of their language
In the world of cybersecurity, every day brings new challenges and potential threats. However, some vulnerabilities stand out due to their sheer scale and potential impact. One such issue has recently come to light with CrowdStrike, a well-known name in endpoint protection.
Watch this Video explaining CrowdStrike catastrophe from 7:15 onward: The
Albert Einstein famously defined insanity as doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. This notion seems strikingly relevant when looking at CrowdStrike and George Kurtz. Back in 2010
Under the leadership of George Kurtz, then CTO of McAfee, a faulty update was pushed in April 2010 that